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Abstract 
We investigate factors from firm side that determine their financing pattern for new 
investment projects and their decision to choose formal, informal credit, or both. For 
financing pattern of new investment project, we use Random-effect model while 
Unordered-Multinomial Logistic is used to estimate probability of choosing any of four 
choices to access to finance, say, formal credit, informal credit, both of them, or none of them. 
Our analysis is based on a panel of around 2200 small and medium sized enterprises with 
7900 observations extracted from the “Survey of small and medium scale manufacturing 
enterprises in Viet Nam” in 2005, 2007, and 2009. 
Keywords: Small and medium sized enterprises, Access to finance, Formal credit, Informal 
credit, Viet Nam 
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Introduction and Research Objectives 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are perceived to be the backbone of any 
economies worldwide by their main contributions to national income, job creation, poverty 
alleviation, export promotion, etc. For instance, recent annual report from European 
commission(EC, 2011) showed that, despite the fragile economic environment, SMEs have 
retained the key-led growth of the European economy, accounting for more than 98% of all 
enterprises, generating 67% of total employment and 58% of gross value added in 2012. Data 
and reports from SMEs sub-group also point out that SMEs in developing countries also play 
crucial role with their contribution to employment of 45% and to annual GDP of 33%. 
In Viet Nam, since the promulgation of the Enterprise Law, with their rapid development in 
terms of both quantity and quality, SMEs have made considerable contributions to the 
country’s economic development. SMEs represent 99% of the number of businesses, as well 
as 77% of the workforce and produce around 40% of annually GDP (Runckel, 2011). In 
addition, during 2001-2007, this sector made up for 24% of total industrial production value 
and approximately 50% of total export value. In 2008, the amount of capital investment of 
the sector was 220.5 thousand billion VND, equivalent to 31% total country investment (MPI, 
2010). In Table 1, we present some performance indicators of SMEs in Viet Nam. 
However, despite of their major contributions, SMEs are facing a number of obstacles to 
develop; and financing is an important one among them. SMEs are generally considered  
riskier than large firms because they have lower survival rate, larger variance of profitability 
and growth (OECD, 1998). As a result, SMEs often suffer from credit rationing or higher 
interest rate. And financing constraints indeed limit their growth (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 
2006). In least developed countries, such as Sub-Sahara Africa, access to finance is the most 
important obstacle to SME entry and growth investment(Fjose, Grünfeld, & Green, 2010). In 
Viet Nam, according to a recent research conducted by VCCI, 75% SMEs would like to seek 
bank loans but only about 30% of them succeeded. It is because not only is the lending 
procedure too much complicated but the interest rate charging on SMEs is also too high (for 
example, interest rate charged for small enterprises at VIB bank on 20 November 2012 was 
16.29% per year1) 
The above context emerges the question of what factors determine the accessibility to finance 
of SMEs in Viet Nam. When searching for the answer, several reasons have been noted to our 
review. Nevertheless, previous studies have either dealt with only some specific factors such 
as networking (Le & Nguyen, 2009; Malesky & Taussig, 2009)or based on small sample 
size(Le, Venkatesh, & Nguyen, 2006; Thanh, Cuong, Dung, & Chieu, 2011). Moreover, these 
articles mainly focused on accessing bank credit while neglecting informal sources as well as 
making no explanation why some firms access two types of credit. Therefore, our study 
attempts to accomplish the following objectives: 
                                                        
1 Retrieved from VIB bank website on 19 Jan 2013 at http://vib.com.vn/1775-truy-cap-nhanh/2275-lai-suat-cho-vay.aspx 
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• To determine financing pattern of SMEs; specifically, when investing in new projects, 
how firms decide the proportion of using their own capital, bank capital or other 
sources of capital. 
• To investigate factors that influence access to finance, particularly, whether to use 
formal capital, informal capital, both of them or none of them. 
Literature Review 
Previous literature worldwide has suggested that factors determining access to finance of 
firms can be divided into four main groups: Owner’s characteristics, firm’s characteristics, 
firm’s location, and ownership types (Akoten, Sawada, & Otsuka, 2006; Beck, 2007; Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Coleman, 2004; Le et al., 2006; Rand, 2007; Thanh et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, many scholars have also emphasized the role of networking, particularly in the 
context of firms in developing countries (Le & Nguyen, 2009; Malesky & Taussig, 2009). 
Therefore, in the following parts, we will go through these determinants. 
2.1 Characteristics of Owners 
Owners/managers 2  characteristics, which include their age, education, professional 
experience, management skills, etc., have been consistently proposed to influence firms’ 
access to credit. Concerning educational background, Kasseeah & Thoplan (2012) suggested 
that the level of education of owner, which is measured by primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, do contribute positively to the performance of SMEs. SMEs with more highly 
educated owners seem to perform better even after controlling for age, experience and 
employment level. Higher education brings business owners to a better position to understand 
the requirements for operating a business and may help them manage various aspects of the 
business. Education associated with experience also equips managers to better prepare and 
present a loan application in the form that a lender wants to see (Coleman, 2004). Empirically, 
in a study of 4400 small firms, Bates (1990) found that owners with four or five years of 
college/university could access to bank capital more easily but there was no evidence that 
high education level improve access to non-bank capital. 
The impact of education on access to finance for SMEs in Viet Nam, however, seems very 
mixed. On the one hand, Thanh et al. (2011) found that firm owner’s experience significantly 
reduce the probability of bank loan rejected. On the other hand, Le, Venkatesh, & 
Nguyen(2006)argued that owner’s education is negatively correlated with bank loan. 
According to Rand (2007),there are likely  negative correlations between being high or 
medium skilled and accessing credit, reflecting that owners with higher skill levels have 
lower demand for debts and finance themselves by internal funds or that better educated and 
experienced owners are more likely to know when their application will be rejected and 
therefore refrain from applying.  
In terms of gender, Baydas, Bahloul, & Adams(1995) and Tsai(2004)both suggested that less 
educated and “finance literate” women participate more in the informal financial transactions 
                                                        
2 In this paper, we do not distinguish the term owner and manager. In other words, owner and manager will be used as 
inter-changeable words. 
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compared to men. In contrast, Yaldiz (2011), argued that to  establish  and  conduct  a  
business  in  men’s  world,  business  women  can  be considered  as  better  
educated,  more  talented  compared  to  other  business  men. As a result, he 
empirically proved that women are likely to have more ability to access formal credit.  
Regarding to owner’s age, Yaldiz et al.(2010) proposed the positive correlation between 
owner’s age and working experience, which likely helps reduce the firm’s financing obstacles. 
However, Nakano & Nguyen(2011) argued that the older the leaders get, the more risk-averse 
and less energetic at work they are. As a result, they seem to prefer use more formally 
external loans or their own asset rather than approaching informal debts.  
In brief, owner’s characteristics might have very mixed impact on accessibility of formal 
and/or informal capital and the result seems to vary across countries.  
2.2 Characteristics of Firms 
Various researches have pointed out that credit accessibility varies among firms according to 
firm-specific characteristic, and its characteristic, in return, determines the best suited way for 
firms to approach credit. In particular, size of firms which is one of the most reliable 
predictor of firms’ financing obstacles also explains to firms’ differentiate fund choices 
((Beck, 2007; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, 2006; Bernanke, Gertler, & 
Gilchrist, 1994; Devereux & Schiantarelli, 1990). Beck and Levine (2004) suggested that 
small firms have to finance a larger share of investment with informal sources, such as 
moneylenders or family and friends or heavily depend on short-term bank loans; whereas 
larger firms facilitate their investment by a greater share of formal external sources like 
equity, bank finance. Technically, this finding matches the theoretical models that used fixed 
transaction costs and information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems as basis for 
financial market frictions3. Economically, large firms, which face less constraint in credit are 
likely to access many alternative fund sources. In the meanwhile, small firms with their small 
size give a signal of relatively higher credit risk so that the banks, which are risk-averse, has 
less incentive to lend them money (Black, 2012). As a result, they are likely to depend more 
on informal sources. While firm size used to be measured by the number of employees and 
the annual turnover thresholds (EC, 2005), Coleman’s report (2002)also suggested that a 
firm’s profit could be introduced as a useful proxy. 
Age of a firm has also been reported to determine the choice of credit finance in many studies. 
Gertler (1988) stated that information asymmetries are likely to be especially large for young 
and newly-established firms, because creditors have not had enough time to monitor such 
firms and because such firms have not had enough time to build long-term relationships with 
suppliers of finance. As a result, young enterprises, especially the start-ups, are likely to seek 
finance from informal sources, whereas the older have more advantage in searching for bank 
debts or equity. This result was also empirically proved by many authors, such as Akoten, et 
al.,(2006), Oliner & Rudebusch(1992) and Beck, et al., (2006). However, Rand (2007) found 
a negative relation between age and holding debts. His argument was that old firms are often 
                                                        
3 See Levine (2005) for an overview 
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more settled and less likely to engage in activities that risky and requiring a huge amount of 
capital investment, so they may seek formal sources of credit less. Besides, with the support 
from pecking order theory proposed by Myers(1984), old firms are more likely to finance 
themselves through their internal credit (Le, 2012).  
Last but not least, it is also claimed that in less developed countries where institutional 
system is not well-developed, collateral and guarantees, which are represented by the ratio of 
tangible asset in total asset, remain one of 3 main factors leading to banks’ lending decision 
(Uchida, 2011). While Viet Nam’s institutional system is far from developed, the bank 
system is less competitive and possession of property rights still have a large positive impact 
on ease of credit, firms that lack collateral assets account for a major proportion of rejected 
loan requesters (Thanh et al., 2011). 
2.3 Firm’s Location 
Beck (2007) noted there is a broad variation of firms’ financing obstacles among countries 
after controlling for cross-country difference in GDP per capita, suggesting that geography or, 
more specifically, firms’ location is likely to involve in credit constraint, and therefore is an 
explanatory factor for firms’ credit determination. Yaldiz(2011)empirically showed that firms 
located in smaller cities rely more on informal credit compared to firms in bigger cities. 
Gine(2011) documented that the transaction cost to evaluate the creditworthiness of a firm is 
likely high in rural areas, hence bank are less willing to lend firms in the rural or 
long-distance areas. On the other hand, firms located in the urban areas or near a commercial 
bank may access bank loans likely more easily since it is convenient for a bank to monitor 
and obtain “soft” information that allow it to give an decision on loan requests (Petersen & 
Rajan, 2002) 
2.4 Ownership Types 
Literature has also revealed the diverse financing pattern across firm categories. Generally 
speaking, government-owned firms, which suffer less financing obstacles than others, can 
access to formal debts more easily since they receive direct budgetary support from the 
government and favorable treatment from government-owned financial institutions (Harrison, 
Love, & McMillan, 2004; Laeven, 2003). 
2.5 The Role of Networking 
This last determinant seems to have a great voice over financing pattern of SMEs, 
particularly in developing countries where financial system is under-developed. According to 
Shane & Cable (2002), networks can be used to reduce information symmetry in 
creditor/debtor relationship. At large, networking and relationships substitute for the lack of 
effective market institution, and can be an effective way for firms to access external credit, 
including bank loans. Networks  and  relationships  increase  a firm's  legitimacy,  
which  in  turn  positively  influence  the firm's  access  to credit. In addition, 
Safavian & Wimpey (2007) and Straub (2005) agreed that networks are also important for 
firms which largely rely on informal sources of credit. Lenders rely primarily on “soft” 
information gathered through contact over time with the SME, observing its profitability 
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performance and previous loan payments history to judge the creditworthiness of the firms 
and to price the loans. This result is consistent with Rand (2007) finding that firms which 
have borrowed from the creditor before and have built up some kind of business relationship 
are faced with significantly lower cost of capitals. Further, Bougheas, Mizen, &Yalcin(2006) 
suggested that network is a dominant determinant that helps firms less financially constrained, 
since relationships with the lenders makes a firm easier to access credit, even when it is weak 
on other criteria. For the case of Viet Nam, Le & Nguyen (2009) found that official network, 
the relationship with government officials or bankers, are significantly and positively 
associated with the possibility of acquiring bank loans; however, it doesn’t have enough 
power to influence the actual amount of bank lending. In another approach, Le et al.(2006) 
also added that networking for firms in the first stage more effectively help them access 
credit than that of later growth stage firms. They argued that through networking, especially 
with government officials, firm legitimacy increases in the eye of aid donors and government 
support programs, hence raising the accessibility to the less expensive sources of financing. 
On the other hand, they also suggested that social networks, especially network with 
members of social organization or clubs, significantly increase the ability of approaching 
informal credits. Malesky & Taussig (2009) further added that bank credit accessibility is 
likely easier for Viet Nam’s rural companies, but more difficult to firms in more competitive 
and better governed urban environments. They explained that the result comes from the fact 
that Viet Nam state-owned commercial banks’ lending purpose is in favor of rural enterprises 
to improve national welfare.  
Data and models 
3.1 Financing Pattern for New Investment Project 
We first examine the determinants of financing pattern for new investment project of SMEs. 
The following model is to be tested: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it itSOURCE OWNER FIRM REGION NETWORK OWNERSHIP vα β β β β β= + + + + + + (3.1) 
In which: 
t is the time periods, which is 2005, 2007, and 2009 
SOURCEit is the dependent variable representing sources of financing new investment project, 
namely using own capital, borrowing from bank, and using other sources. These sources are 
expressed as the percentage of total credit.  
OWNERi is a set of variable representing owner’s/manager’s characteristics, including: age, 
gender, ethnic, basic education level, professional education level and knowledge about 
Enterprise law and Tax law 
FIRMi is a set of variable representing firm’s characteristics, including: firm’s age, firm’s 
profit (proxy for firm’s size), a dummy variable that equals to 1 if it is easy to access main 
roads and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located near a rail;a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm export and 0 otherwise, one dummy variable for land 
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ownership which equal to one if firm has certificate of land use right and 0 otherwise, a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has an accounting book and 0 otherwise. 
REGIONi variableis a set of dummy variables that take values of 1 if the enterprises are 
located in either Ha Noi, PhuTho, Ha Tay, HaiPhong, Nghe An, Quang Nam, KhanhHoa, 
Lam Dong, Hochiminh or Long An and take values of 0 if otherwise. 
NETWORKi variable includes number of bank officials the firm frequently contact with, 
number of business association memberships, and one dummy variable that equals to 1 if 
firm’s owner/manager is a member of Communist party. 
vit is the error terms 
3.2 Determinants of Access to Finance 
In order to go deeper insight into the determinants of the choice of formal or informal credit 
access, we also run the multiple-logistic model in which we keep the same set of independent 
variables but the dependent variable becomes choices of credit access, say, formal credit, 
informal credit, both of them or none of them.  
The firms’ credit access is an unordered categorical variable which is denoted by choiceijt 
whereas index i identifies firms, j is the alternative within the choice set and t indicates the 
time firms made the choice. Since we fit the multinomial model with a series of choices, we 
let the default base category is choiceijt= 1, which represents for using owner’s fund choice, 
and then we find the changes of choices over time by comparing each of the other alternatives 
in the category with the base choice. Formally, our estimation model can be displayed as 
follows: 
log ቀ௖௛௢௜௖௘೔ೕ೟)௖௛௢௜௖௘೔భ೟ ቁ = ߙ௜௝ + ௜ܺ௝௧ߚ௜௝ + ݑ௝, where  uj ~ IID(0, σu
2) and j≠ 1        (3.2) 
Xijt is the same set of explanatory variables that is used in the previous model. 
Therefore, the probability of making choice j conditional on observed characteristics Xit that 
vary between firms over time and unobserved individual effect αi that are time constant has 
the following form: 
P(j |Xit, αi) = ୣ୶୮	(௑೔೟ఉೕାఈ೔ೕ)	∑ ୣ୶୮	(௑೔೟ఉೖାఈ೔ೖ)రೖసభ , 
where the unobserved heterogeneity αis identically and independently distributed over the 
firms with the mean a and variance-covariance matrix W, denoted α ~ IID (a, W). 
Finally, it is important to note that in both two equations (3.1) and (3.2), we use random 
effect (RE) model for estimation. We have reasons to do so when taking into account 
characteristics of our panel data and we also use Dubin-Wu-Hausman test to empirically 
confirm the appropriateness of RE4.  
                                                        
4 Details of these tests are available upon request. 
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Data used for our analysis was based on the Survey of small and medium scale manufacturing 
enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam which were conducted by ILSSA in the Ministry of Labour, 
Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and University of Copenhagen with funding from 
DANIDA in 1991, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2007, and 2009. Due to the inconsistency of the 
questionnaires before 2005, we only merged the dataset in 2005, 2007, and 2009. Our panel 
includes about 2200 firms and 7900 observations.  
Table 2 summarizes and explains main variables used in our models. 
Running pairwise correlation test to identify potential correlations between variables, we 
decide to omit etp_law, ownership1 and edu_bs4 variables from regression models because 
of its relatively high correlation with other variables in the model (over 0.7)5. Moreover, we 
also decide not to introduce the interaction variables into the model due to the scope of the 
data. In particular, the growth stage is proposed to be subjectively measured by the judgment 
of firm’s manager on its business condition (Le et al, 2006) or objectively measured by the 
current structure of the organization. These two sorts of information are not available in our 
dataset.  
Results and Discussion 
4.1 Financing Pattern for New Investment Project 
Table 3 presents results of RE estimation for model 3.1. Interesting results are yielded from 
the model. First of all, owner’s demographic characteristics (age, ethnic, and gender) seem 
not important in determining what sources of credit to finance new investment. Owner’s 
education level, however, does. Keeping other things constant, we find that the owner who 
was an unskilled worker or elementary worker use less proportion of other sources financing 
than the one who was not. By contrary, the one who obtained college/university/post graduate 
used more proportion of other source finance and less own capital. Interestingly, the result is 
opposite when it comes to owner’s knowledge about Tax law variable. The owner with better 
tax knowledge is more likely to use more bank capital to finance new investment, cetaris 
paribus. These results are opposite to Bates (1990),Coleman(2004), and Fatoki & Odeyemi 
(2010) but very consistent with what have been found for the case of SMEs in Viet Nam by 
Le, Venkatesh, & Nguyen (2006)and Rand (2007). 
Regarding to firm’s characteristics, as expected, firm’s size is strongly correlated to sources 
of financing new investment. Larger firms seem to rely more on self-capital and bank capital 
and less on other sources. Having export activity significantly decreases the use of own 
capital to finance new investment and increases the use of other source’s finance but is not 
statistically significant to the choice of bank finance. Similar effects to export variable are 
also seen with the variable of firm’s accounting book availability. Firm’s age and favorable 
locations nearby main road do not significantly determine borrowing structure. One result 
that is not expected is firms easily access to rail has lower proportion of borrowing from bank 
and higher proportion of borrowing from other sources. Lastly, having certificate of land 
right ownership does not make it easier to access bank’s finance. 
                                                        
5 We do not report pairwise correlation table here. It is available upon request. 
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Network variables, which we predict to be strongly important in financing structure, yield 
expected results. Stronger network with bank officials remarkably increases the use of bank 
and other sources financing while reducing the proportion of using own capital. Our result 
strongly supports Malesky & Taussig(2009). Being a member of business association, 
however, do not have statistically significant effect on accessing bank capital. Member of 
business association appears to be helpful for firm to access other sources of capital, which is 
understandable. Lastly, there is no different across all types of financing new investment 
whether the owner is a member of Communist Party or not. 
Finally, the regional variables show interesting results.  Firms in small provinces such as 
NgheAn rely mostly on their own capital rather than bank or other sources of credit which is 
reasonable as the availability of financial institutions is not widespread. In big cities like 
HaNoi, HaiPhong, HaTay, and Hochiminh, where financial institutions are everywhere, yet, 
firms also do not find it’s easier to access bank loans. This result might reflect the ability of 
firms in big cities to raise capital on their own or within their extensive networks. 
Alternatively, more bank branches do not mean easier loan application evaluation. In addition, 
having more firms also means higher opportunity cost due to longer queue.  
4.2 Determinants of Access to Finance 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the determinants of access to the informal, formal 
sources or both of them. The results suggest that borrowers from informal sources like friends 
and relatives seem to be young managers. The older they are, the more probability they can 
access to bank debts and/or equities. This finding is consistent with Rand (Rand, 2007), 
Akoten, Sawada, & Otsuka (2006), and Johnson(2004). Young managers are likely to lack 
social capital than the older including leading experience, financing network, and 
accountability, etc. which in turn let the banks, which are risk-averse, are less willing to lend 
money. Hence, they have no alternatives but relying on their own assets or friends and 
relatives’ capital. In the other hand, the results surprisingly mention that the length of time a 
firm operates doesn’t help them out of financing constraints. Additionally, the more 
incumbent is a firm in the market, the less likely the firm access to both informal and formal 
credit. This finding gets support from Rand (2007) report saying that old firms are more 
settled and likely require fewer debts than the others. 
The results also suggest that human capital of a firm’s owners, which reflects in their basic 
and professional education, support the firms to seek finance, though most of these 
coefficients are not statistically significant. The higher education or more experienced 
managers may not only have larger social network but also make more wise and convincing 
loan applications. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients’ value in formal source 
borrower group higher than the ones in both informal and formal group indicates that, under 
financing constraint, firms prefer to borrow money from banks or issue equity rather than 
asking for informal debts.  
Not surprisingly the more productive firms’ operation, the less financing obstacles they face. 
The finding shows that firms which obtain higher profit significantly have more ability to 
approach both formal and informal debts, whereas the firms got failure in doing business 
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have no choice but leaning on informal credits or owners’ assets. Besides, the findings tell 
that firms more or less face credit constraints no matter what sort of ownership they are. The 
significantly positive coefficients in the Multi-nominal logit model suggest that firms tend to 
solve their financing problem by wisely combining informal and formal borrowings. Due to 
the amount borrowing restriction of informal source and the difficulty of formal credit access, 
firms are less likely to satisfy their credit demand by being solely prone to bank loans, 
owner’s capital or informal fund. In addition, the common positive correlation of private, 
partnership and limited liability companies with formal financing is consistent with the 
finding reported by Rand (2007) that these particular firms are of the highest demand for 
external funds. Last but not least, export firms are suggested to face less financing constraint 
than the other thanks to the supportive lending policies of the government in favor of exports. 
Even the results are not significant they show that these firms tend to borrow more from 
formally external funds like bank debts rather than seeking for informal credit. 
Although collateral possession was suggested to be the crucial key to approach bank debts, 
the result herein suggests that this characteristic doesn’t function well as expected. The 
magnitude of coefficient reveals that firms which have more valuable collateral, especially 
lands, are likely to approach more formal funds than informal ones; however, the asset 
doesn’t help firms much in getting rid of financing constraint. Nevertheless, these results are 
not statistically significant.  
While collateral does not matter, accounting book does. The result indicates that firms which 
have a standard account book are reported to have more probability in accessing formally 
external credits. This result also comes from the reduction of asymmetric information as well 
as judgment cost from formal creditors. In particular, account book is a reliable thing that 
banks can base on to assess firms’ credit worthiness in terms of profitability, risks, 
productivity.  This finding coincides with the previous reports from Allee & Yohn(2009) 
and Uchida (2011). 
Again, the network variable does help firms reduce their credit obstacles. On one hand, firms 
which have relationship with banks do help them less financing constrained than the others. 
As a result, they not only can access bank debts but also have more advantage to persuade 
informal creditors to give them loans. This finding can be explained by the fact that the 
network between creditors and borrowers, which may come from previous operations, 
owners’ private contacts, etc., reduces the asymmetric information as well as the cost banks 
have to spend to judge firms’ business productivity. On the other hand, the owner’s social 
network which is also represented by his ethnic significantly helps increase credit 
accessibility. Interestingly the results tell us that managers belonging to majority ethnic group 
likely find more easily to seek finance more bank debts or equity as well as informal funds 
rather than ones coming from minority group, which is also consistent with the reports from 
Akoten, et al.(2006) 
The firms’ geography surprisingly reveals another story about firms’ credit access. Again, our 
finding in the second model is very consistent to result from model of financing pattern. 
Firms which locate in the big cities like Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh or HaiPhong are used to be 
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supposed to access more formal credits than the informal due to relatively lower transaction 
cost; however, the findings tells us that the reduction in transaction cost is likely not enough 
to offset the time consuming to queue up the borrower lines and access the credit so that these 
firms seem to be prone to borrow from informal funds. This result is also convinced by the 
fact that the informal lending market is more developed and is of complex operation than 
ones in the small cities. Besides, firms located in the areas which receive higher Provincial 
Competitiveness Index like Quang Nam, KhanhHoa, NgheAn significantly increase access to 
formal credits. This observation, however, is inconsistent with the finding suggested by Rand 
(2007) and Phuong (2012). These results are consistent with the ones proposed by Thanh et 
al(2011) about State-owned commercial banks (SOCB)’s lending targets in favor of rural 
enterprises. 
Implications and Conclusion 
This paper used the Survey of small and medium scale manufacturing enterprises in Viet 
Nam to determine the financing pattern for new investment project and their decision to seek 
formal, informal credit or both. By random effect model and multinomial logistic model, we 
expect to receive the consistent results from different approaches. After controlling for 
correlation, endogeneity, and model specification, these models both demonstrated interesting 
results about financing pattern and choice of capital of SMEs. Firstly, while types of 
ownership seems not important, having accounting book and the size of the firms do matter in 
the way that small firms are likely to have more constraint than the bigger ones. Secondly, 
networking, which includes official networking and social network, significantly increases 
SMEs’ ability to access to bank and other source of capital. Thirdly, firms located in big 
cities like Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh or HaiPhong are less likely to access formal credit and tend to 
increase more proportion of debts coming from informal sources, which is converse to what 
people used to suppose. As a result, the advantages of locating in a better infrastructure like 
staying near the railway or main road doesn’t help firms much to get out of their financing 
troubles. In contrast, firms in rural areas seem to use their own capital and access more the 
bank debts and less the informal ones. Lastly, firm’s owner characteristics including age, 
ethnic, professional experience do significantly impact the ability to borrow from formal 
sources. Particularly, firms whose managers are older, from Kinh group and have higher 
professional experience tend to have higher probability to access formally external funds than 
the others.  
Our findings provide an insight into the current supply –demand gap in the capital market in 
Viet Nam and also raise the needs of reconsidering current SMEs supporting programs. On 
one hand, the Government should enhance the firm evaluation system through standardizing 
the accounting and auditing system, orient firms and banks to use more credit guarantee 
funds rather than collateral or property for mortgage. On the other hand, Government should 
encourage firms’ managers to improve their education background or skills by effectively 
organizing the leaders’ training program, in which indirectly strengthen SME’s capacity to 
prepare loan-financed project documentation in order to meet credit provider’s requirements. 
Since there is a mismatch between capital demand and supply, the government could 
encourage firms and banks to create networks. Not only does this activity reduce the 
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asymmetric information between firms and banks, but it also enhances inter-firm corporations 
for urgent or short-term credit needs. Moreover, even the SOCB’s lending purpose is fruitful 
in terms of welfare, there still raises a need to reconsider the unproductive lending systems in 
big cities as firms and banks in urban areas are losing their advantages of lower transaction 
cost due to high competition to bank loans and the development of informal lending market. 
In this case, we think that a large part of informal lending system should be well administered 
and upgraded into an official one like inter-firms funds.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Some performance indicators of in Viet Nam SMEs 
Performance criteria 2000 2004 2008 
Number of employees (person) 236253 431942 565893 
Capital resource at 31/12 (bil.VND) 18059 49346 163904 
Net turnover (bil.VND) 71072 136156 386062 
Profit before taxes (bil.VND) 770 1342 2189 
Tax and other contributions 
to the national budget (bil.VND) 
1131 2846 7940 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Viet Nam Enterprise Census 2000 - 2008 
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Table 2. Summary of main variables 
Variable Explanation Mean SD N 
Dependent variables 
SOURCE 
Using own capital (%) 45.011 45.929 4456 
Borrowing from bank (%) 13.962 30.613 4456 
Borrowing from others (%) 41.027 47.048 4456 
CHOICE 
None of informal/formal (=1) 
2.287 1.143 8110 Informal source (=2) 
Formal source (=3) 
Both formal and informal (=4)    
Explanatory variables 
gender 1 = male, 0 otherwise 0.672913 0.469178 8111 
age Age of owner/manager 45.22315 10.43081 8111 
firm_age Age of firm 13.14022 10.49233 8080 
road There is main road leading to the firm 0.771298 0.420023 8111 
rail Firm is located near a railway station 0.365553 0.499708 8111 
ethnic 1=Kinh, 0 otherwise 0.934402 0.247593 8110 
cp_mem 
Owner/Manager is a member of Communist 
party = 1, 0 otherwise 0.080385 0.271905 8111 
export Export=1, 0 otherwise 0.054001 0.226033 8111 
acc_book Firm has accounting book = 1, 0 otherwise 0.383677 0.495354 8111 
edu_bs 
Owner/Manager basic education 
(0=None-4=high school) 4.413513 0.812592 8111 
edu_pro 
Owner/Manager’s professional education 
(0=unskilled-4=college/university) 2.431389 1.317883 8111 
size Number of laborers at establishment 19.86081 59.10234 8111 
network_bank 
Number of bank officials the firm frequently 
contact with 0.847842 1.073351 8110 
member Number of business association membership 0.127237 0.435669 8103 
etp_law Knowledge about enterprise law 2.782614 1.091325 8110 
tax_law Knowledge about tax law 2.604439 1.033121 8110 
land_ownership 1=has certificate of land use right 0.566391 0.495603 8111 
infml_loan Ever access to informal loan = 1, 0 otherwise 0.5291 0.499183 8110 
bank_loan Ever access to bank loan = 1, 0 otherwise 0.379162 0.485208 8110 
own_k 
Using own capital to finance new investment 
(%) 45.01116 45.92941 4456 
bank_k 
Using bank capital to finance new investment 
(%) 13.96223 30.61262 4456 
otherssource_k 
Using other sources to finance new investment 
(%) 41.02661 47.04836 4456 
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Table 3. Determinants of Financing Pattern for New Investment Project 
Variable Explaination Use own capital Borrow from bank 
Borrow from other 
sources 
gender 1 = male, 0 otherwise -1.081 (1.102) 1.472 (0.93) -0.285 (0.81) 
lnage Ln age of owner/manager -0.270 (2.339) 0.952 (1.98) -0.365 (1.74) 
firm_age Age of firm -0.053 (0.058) 0.000 (0.05) 0.059 (0.04) 
road 
There is main road leading to 
the firm 
-2.119 (1.286) 0.340 (1.09) 1.770 (0.93) 
rail 
Firm is located near a railway 
station 
1.831 (1.074) -3.912*** (0.91) 1.949* (0.76) 
ethnic 1=Kinh, 0 otherwise 5.416 (3.057) -1.628 (2.59) -3.751 (2.23) 
cp_mem 
Owner/Manager is a member 
of Communist party 
0.604 (1.755) -0.382 (1.49) -0.131 (1.28) 
export Firm has export -5.379* (2.122) -2.415 (1.80) 7.655*** (1.56) 
acc_book Firm has accounting book  -7.743*** (1.690) -0.270 (1.43) 7.847*** (1.22) 
network_bank 
Number of bank officials the 
firm frequently contact with 
-9.355*** (0.473) 7.118*** (0.40) 1.994*** (0.34) 
member 
Number of business 
association membership 
-1.291 (1.082) -0.922 (0.92) 2.047* (0.80) 
etp_law 
Knowledge about enterprise 
law 
2.726*** (0.762) -1.63* (0.64) -1.079* (0.54) 
tax_law Knowledge about tax law -1.014 (0.730) 1.88** (0.62) -0.856 (0.52) 
lnprofit Ln profit 8.730*** (0.178) 3.25*** (0.15) -12.10*** (0.13) 
edu_bs2 Not finished primary -11.367 (11.246) 12.705 (9.52) -1.123 (8.01) 
edu_bs3 Finished primary -12.253 (10.909) 8.920 (9.23) 3.652 (7.78) 
edu_bs4 Finished lower secondary -8.428 (10.777) 6.136 (9.12) 2.460 (7.69) 
edu_bs5 Finished upper Secondary -7.302 (10.789) 4.740 (9.13) 2.752 (7.70) 
edu_pro1 Unskilled 1.847 (1.546) 1.511 (1.31) -3.398** (1.11) 
edu_pro2 Elementary worker 3.132 (1.614) 2.134 (1.37) -5.386*** (1.14) 
edu_pro4 
Technical worker with 
certificate 
-0.511 (1.653) 1.260 (1.40) -0.648 (1.18) 
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edu_pro5 
College/university/post-gradua
te 
-6.492** (2.113) -1.998 (1.79) 8.46*** (1.51) 
ownership1 Household business  27.293 (18.640) -16.550 (15.78) -12.030 (13.38) 
ownership2 Private/sole proprietorship 27.035 (18.660) -18.823 (15.79) -9.443 (13.39) 
ownership3 Partnership 31.775 (19.947) -21.151 (16.88) -11.087 (14.34) 
ownership4 Collective/Cooperative 25.093 (18.783) -20.368 (15.90) -5.910 (13.49) 
ownership5 Limited liability company 21.747 (18.639) -18.270 (15.78) -4.252 (13.38) 
ownership6 Joint stock company with state 3.086 (20.633) -7.422 (17.47) 4.077 (14.83) 
ownership7 
Joint stock company without 
state 
16.531 (18.808) -16.379 (15.92) -0.494 (13.51) 
region1 Hanoi 7.126** (2.696) -12.21*** (2.28) 4.862* (2.06) 
region2 PhuTho -5.816* (2.644) 8.825*** (2.24) -3.245 (2.03) 
region3 Ha Tay 9.685*** (2.579) -12.47*** (2.18) 2.358 (1.98) 
region4 HaiPhong -5.143 (2.841) -5.471* (2.40) 10.807*** (2.17) 
region5 Nghe An 10.909*** (2.591) -6.366** (2.19) -4.530* (1.98) 
region6 Quang Nam 4.995 (2.875) 0.441 (2.43) -5.713** (2.21) 
region7 KhanhHoa -4.619 (3.296) -0.974 (2.79) 5.742* (2.52) 
region8 Lam Dong -3.030 (3.604) 2.154 (3.05) 0.293 (2.75) 
region9 Hochiminh city 1.327 (2.619) -7.926*** (2.22) 6.472** (1.99) 
land_ownershi
p 
Firm has certificate of land use 
right 
1.925 (1.053) 0.145 (0.89) -1.841* (0.77) 
Constant -50.979* (23.631) -10.261 (20.00) 
162.199**
* 
(17.03) 
R-square 0.514 0.229 0.760 
Number of obs 4344 4344 4344 
Legend:*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001.  
Standard errors in parenthesis  
Journal of Management Research 
ISSN 1941-899X 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 2 
www.macrothink.org/jmr 258
Table 4. Determinants of access to formal/informal finance 
Variable Informal source Formal source Both informal and formal source 
gender 0.094 (0.07) 0.138 (0.09) 0.105 (0.08) 
lnage -0.55*** (0.15) 0.53*** (0.19) -0.830*** (0.18) 
firm_age -0.004 (0.00) -0.011** (0.00) -0.01** (0.00) 
road 0.106 (0.08) -0.187** (0.10) 0.055 (0.10) 
rail 0.345*** (0.07) -0.57*** (0.10) 0.208** (0.09) 
ethnic 0.055 (0.13) 0.395** (0.20) 0.764*** (0.20) 
cp_mem -0.103 (0.13) 0.035 (0.16) -0.021 (0.15) 
export -0.023 (0.18) 0.04 (0.21) 0.183 (0.19) 
acc_book 0.037 (0.10) 0.133 (0.15) 0.408*** (0.14) 
network_bank 1.038*** (0.06) 1.876*** (0.06) 1.993*** (0.06) 
member 0.113 0.10 0.3** (0.11) 0.249** (0.11) 
tax_law 0.069** (0.04) 0.07 (0.06) 0.055* (0.06) 
lnprofit -0.08*** (0.01) 0.138*** (0.02) 0.014 (0.01) 
edu_bs1 -0.155 (0.37) -0.73 (0.79) -0.261 (0.61) 
edu_bs2 -0.03 (0.17) 0.206 (0.24) -0.043 (0.64) 
edu_bs3 0.076 (0.12) 0.109 (0.16) -0.247 (0.62) 
edu_bs5 -0.041 (0.08) 0.2 (0.11) -0.298 (0.61) 
edu_pro1 -0.15 (0.09) 0.042 (0.13) -0.015 (0.12) 
edu_pro2 -0.260** (0.10) -0.144 (0.14) -0.192 (0.13) 
edu_pro4 -0.222** (0.11) 0.076 (0.15) -0.133 (0.14) 
edu_pro5 -0.241 (0.16) 0.051 (0.23) 0.197 (0.18) 
ownership2 -0.003 (0.13) 0.234 (0.34) 0.042 (0.20) 
ownership3 -0.547 (0.56) 1.38 (0.46) 1.172* (0.13) 
ownership4 -0.193 (0.21) -0.467 (0.29) -1.71* (0.29) 
ownership5 0.142 (0.06) 0.127 (0.34) 0.694*** (0.23) 
ownership6 -1.327 (0.39) -0.994 (0.91) 0..57*** (0.86) 
ownership7 -0.169 (0.09) 0.513 (0.37) 0.466*** (0.53) 
region1 1.015*** (0.19) -0.121 (0.25) 0.467* (0.23) 
region2 0.214 (0.19) 1.130*** (0.23) 1.091*** (0.22) 
region3 -0.179 (0.19) 0.770*** (0.21) 0.830*** (0.21) 
region4 0.433** (0.20) 0.364 (0.25) -0.06 (0.24) 
region5 0.649*** (0.18) 0.744*** (0.22) 0.783*** (0.21) 
region6 -0.232 (0.21) 0.765*** (0.24) 0.568** (0.23) 
region7 1.055*** (0.23) 0.291 (0.31) 0.809*** (0.28) 
region8 0.667*** (0.23) 0.772*** (0.28) 0.687** (0.29) 
region9 0.708*** (0.18) 0.253 (0.22) 0.592*** (0.21) 
land_ownership -0.146** (0.07) -0.052 (0.09) -0.154* (0.08) 
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Constant 1.613* (0.61) -1.716 (0.75) -0.312 0.00 
Pseudo-R square (%) 20.05 
Number of obs 7907 7907 7907 
Legend:*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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